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Ultra-high bandwidth quantum 
secured data transmission
James F. Dynesの, Winci W-S. Tamの, Alan Plewsの, Bernd Fröhlichの, Andrew W. Sharpeの, 
Marco Lucamariniの, Zhiliang Yuanの, Christian Radigは, Andrew Strawば, Tim Edwardsば & 
Andrew J. Shieldsの
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides an attractive means for securing communications in optical 
ボbre networks┻ However┸ deployment of the technology has been hampered by the frequent need for 
dedicated dark ボbres to segregate the very weak quantum signals from conventional traポc┻ Up until 
now the coexistence of QKD with data has been limited to bandwidths that are orders of magnitude 
below those commonly employed in ボbre optic communication networks┻ Using an optimised 
wavelength divisional multiplexing scheme┸ we transport QKD and the prevalent のねね Gb【s data format 
in the forward direction over the same ボbre for the ボrst time┻ We show a full quantum encryption 
system operating with a bandwidth of はねね Gb【s over a のねね km ボbre┻ Exploring the ultimate limits of 
the technology by experimental measurements of the Raman noise, we demonstrate it is feasible 
to combine QKD with のね Tb【s of data over a ひね km link┻ These results suggest it will be possible to 
integrate QKD and other quantum photonic technologies into high bandwidth data communication 
infrastructures, thereby allowing their widespread deployment.
Most demonstrations of QKD1,2 to date have used dark ibre, in which the quantum signals are transmitted sepa-
rately from the conventional data3–5. However, these additional dedicated links are not always available, and even 
when they are, can be prohibitively expensive for the vast majority of applications. hus it is imperative for cost 
efective deployment of the technology, that QKD signals share the same ibre as conventional data6. his is very 
challenging as the data lasers are typically 8 orders of magnitude stronger and produce a broad background spec-
trum of scattered light that can overwhelm the much weaker quantum signals7 and experimental demonstrations 
to date have been limited to data bandwidths of a few tens of Gb/s, orders of magnitude less than the bandwidths 
commonly employed on links in ibre optic communications7–12.
In this report we establish that quantum communication is compatible with high bandwidth optical network-
ing infrastructure. We demonstrate a quantum encryption system, combining QKD with Mb/s key rates and 
encrypted data transport with a bandwidth of 200 Gb/s on the same ibre. We combine QKD with dual polari-
sation quadrature phase shit keying (DP-QPSK) for the data channels for the irst time. he system operates for 
ibres up to 101 km in length, suicient for nearly all links found in metropolitan area networks. Furthermore, 
we explore the efect of even higher data bandwidths, demonstrating that multiplexing QKD and up to 10 Tb/s of 
data is feasible for ibre lengths up to 50 km.
Figure 1 illustrates the combined quantum and classical network layout with a single optical ibre link used 
to transmit traic from both the QKD system (see Methods for details on the QKD protocol) and high speed 
encryptors (HSE). he quantum signals are assigned to a single wavelength (1547.72 nm) on the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) Dense Wavelength Division Multiplexing (DWDM)13 grid corresponding to 
channel number 37. We use ibre optic wavelength multiplexers to combine the QKD signal with multiple data 
channels on the DWDM grid around 1530 nm.
he data transport layer features HSE units with two 100 G Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryptor 
line cards operating DP-QPSK with wavelengths (ITU grid channel numbers) 1529.55 nm (60) and 1529.94 nm 
(60.5) respectively. We chose to adopt a DP-QPSK scheme15 as phase shit keying (PSK) permits a better opti-
cal signal to noise ratio of approximately 3dB than simple on-of keying (OOK) schemes for the same optical 
receiving power15,16. We also remark the data transmission capacity of DP-QPSK is four times higher than that of 
OOK. We use wavelength divisional multiplexing to combine the data and quantum signals on a single ibre pair, 
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with all forward directed traic in the irst ibre and the backward directed traic in the second. his follows the 
usual practice of using a pair of ibres for bi-directional communication17. As well as conforming to the standard 
approach, this helps reduce noise on the quantum channel for ibre distances greater than about 25 km as Raman 
scattering due to strong data signals in the forward direction weakens due to ibre attenuation8.
We have adapted the built-in Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption on the 100 G line cards to 
accept symmetrically pushed quantum keys. his replaces the conventional public key exchange usually required 
to perform AES encryption. 512 bits are extracted from the pushed key and half of these (i.e. 256 bits) are used by 
each 100 G line card for AES encryption in counter mode18.
To minimise the deleterious efect of Raman scattering into the quantum channel7–12, we employ a combina-
tion of spectral, temporal and optical power control. We reduce the launch power of the transmitters into the ibre 
by amplifying the data signals at the receiver side using an Erbium doped ibre ampliier. he launch power was 
chosen to maintain error free data transport ater forward error correction. he value depends on the ibre link 
loss; for example at a ibre distance of 50 km we set the launch power to − 25.5 dBm (2.8 µ W).
Raman scattering into the quantum channel is minimised by an optimised combination of spectral and tempo-
ral iltering. Temporal iltering is accomplished using self-diferencing19 operation of the avalanche photo-diodes 
(APDs) in the quantum receiver. When operated in self-diferencing mode, the APDs can both detect very weak 
avalanches19 as well exhibit low avalanche signal evolution20. his means only avalanches occurring at the start 
of the clock edge contribute to photon counting which results in a short active on-time. herefore single pho-
ton detectors based on self-diferencing APDs exhibit inherent temporal iltering. Temporal iltering results in 
an efective active on-time of around 125 ps, when the single photon detectors are gated at a repetition rate of 
1 GHz. his means ~88% of Raman scattered photons are automatically rejected by temporal iltering through 
the self-diferencing detection technique21. he quantum channel is also iltered spectrally using thin ilm ilters 
with a nominal spectral width of either 100 GHz or 25 GHz (in the latter case, the measured full width at half 
maximum was 15 GHz).
Figure 2 shows the dependence of the secure bit rate as a function of optical ibre distance up to 101 km in 
the presence of 2 × 100 Gbps forward directed encrypted data for the two types of ilters. For the 100 GHz ilter, 
a secure bit rate of 1.9 Mbps (1.2 Mbps) is observed for ibre distances of 35.5 km (50.5 km), suicient to generate 
an AES-256 encryption key every 200 µs. he corresponding ibre losses in these cases were 6.8 dB and 9.6 dB 
respectively.
Simulation of the secure bit rate with the 100 GHz ilter shows that positive secure bit rates are not possible 
at 100 km (blue line, Fig. 2). To elongate the range of the quantum encryption system, we exchange the 100 GHz 
ilter in the quantum receiver for a 25 GHz ilter (red circles). he efect of the narrower ilter is better Raman 
noise rejection, as evidenced by the lower QBER at longer distances (red triangles). Although the secure bit rates 
Figure 1. Quantum secured system for ultra-high data bandwidth encryption. A high speed quantum 
key distribution (QKD) system is combined with a high speed classical data encryptor (HSE). Details of the 
QKD system can be found in ref. 14 and the working principle of the HSE can be found in ref. 15. he multiple 
wavelengths from the HSE are wavelength multiplexed using a dense wavelength division multiplexer (DWDM) 
before multiplexing with the quantum signals using a coarse wavelength division multiplexer (CWDM). 
Quantum signals on the receiver side are spectrally iltered using either a 100 GHz or 25 GHz spectral ilter. 
Quantum keys generated by the QKD system are pushed symmetrically over Ethernet to the respective HSE’s. 
he quantum keys are used to encrypt the 2 × 100 Gb/s data traic using the AES algorithm in real time.
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at shorter distances are now lower due to the higher loss of the 25 GHz ilter, the reach is extended to 101 km 
(equivalent loss of 19.1 dB) with a corresponding secure bit rate of 10 kbps. Continuous operation over 2 hours is 
also shown in the top panel of the inset, Fig. 2. his secure bit rate is still suicient to refresh the AES encryption 
key every 25 ms.
We now explore the maximum data bandwidth that can co-exist with QKD signals. For this study, we populate 
the optical link with additional CW lasers operating at separate wavelengths to simulate Raman noise created by 
the additional data traic. he arrangement is shown in Fig. 3a. Eight supplementary data lasers on a 50 GHz grid 
are multiplexed together with the original 100 G transceivers using the DWDM combiner over the wavelength 
range 1530.33 nm–1533.07 nm. A ibre with a length of 50 km and an average loss of 0.19 dB/km is used. his 
distance was chosen since it is greater than the reach for typical 100 G signal deployments, a reach speciied to 
be transported across a link of up to 40 km as per the IEEE standard22 (currently no standard exists for 1 Tbps or 
10 Tbps data). We set the launch powers of the additional data lasers to the same level as the 100 G transceivers; in 
this case − 25.5 dBm (2.8 µ W). As before a 100 GHz optical ilter is used to spectrally isolate the quantum signals 
at the quantum receiver side.
Figure 2. Fibre distance dependence. Experimental secure bit rate as a function of ibre distance in the 
presence of 2 × 100 G forward directed classical data traic over the same ibre (see Methods for details on the 
QKD protocol). Data is reported for two diferent ilter widths, 100 GHz (blue circles) and 25 GHz (red circles). 
Corresponding sited bit rates and quantum bit error rates are displayed as squares and triangles respectively. 
he solid and dashed lines are calculated using numerical simulation (see refs 8, 11 and 15 for more details). he 
simulation fully accounts for Raman forward scattering by the classical data traic into the quantum channel. 
Error bar is two standard deviations. Efective ibre losses are shown on the top axis. Inset: Secure bit rate and 
data bit error rate (before forward error correction) for a duration of 2 hours at a ibre length of 101 km.
Figure 3. High bandwidth experimental simulation. (a) Eight continuous wave (CW) optical transceivers 
are wavelength multiplexed with the original two 100 G transceivers. Each transceiver operates on a separate 
wavelength of the 50 GHz DWDM grid spanning 1529.55 nm → 1533.07 nm. he optical launch power of each 
transceiver is set using a variable optical attenuator (VOA) to − 25.5 dBm. (b) Secure bit rate as a function of 
time for 18 hours of continuous operation in the presence of 10 classical data channels representing 1 Tbps of 
data traic over the same ibre (blue circles). he corresponding quantum bit error rate (blue triangles) is also 
shown. Inset: Data bandwidth dependence of the secure bit rate and QBER from 0.1 → 1 Tbps. Solid and dashed 
lines are results from numerical simulation.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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Raising the power of the data lasers in the optical ibre link is expected to increase the Raman scatter and 
thereby deteriorate the QKD performance. However, the observed secure bit rate with all 10 transceivers switched 
on shows very little reduction. A secure bit rate of > 1 Mbps is achieved over a duration of 18 hours, Fig. 3b, blue 
circles. his demonstrates that QKD can co-exist with 10 × 100 G data channels, corresponding to an aggregate 
bandwidth of 1 Tbps.
To investigate the ultimate bandwidth that can be combined with QKD, we increased the launch power of the 
10 data lasers. his simulates the efect of adding additional data channels, provided that the noise in the quan-
tum channel varies linearly with the data laser power. Furthermore, since the 100 G channels are launched at a 
wavelength around 1530 nm, this relects the worst case of Raman scattering into a quantum channel wavelength 
of ~1550 nm for the C-band wavelength range between 1530 and 1565 nm, since the Raman scattering coei-
cient for 1530 nm is the highest. We also note the 25 GHz ilter can in principle have very high isolation – thus 
the Raman scattering efect into the quantum channel of adjacent classical channels would be the same as for 
non-adjacent classical channels. In the following experiment we ensure that the total optical power is < 0 dBm so 
that non-linear efects in the ibre are negligible12.
We irst look at extending the data bandwidth when using a 100 GHz ilter in the quantum receiver. Figure 4 
shows the secure bit rate dependence on the experimentally simulated data bandwidth for this case (blue circles). 
Notice that QKD with a inite bit rate is possible for bandwidths up to 6 Tb/s. At these high simulated data band-
widths almost all the contribution to the QBER (blue triangles) is due to Raman scattering from the data lasers. 
hese results are improved further by use of a 25 GHz ilter in the quantum receiver (red circles). In this case the 
data bandwidth can reach 10 Tb/s, along with a QKD key rate of 139 kb/s.
heoretical simulations, shown as solid lines in Fig. 4, are plotted for three separate distances, 25 km, 50 km 
and 75 km. he longer distance of 75 km illustrates positive secure bit rates even beyond a simulated bandwidth of 
1 Tb/s. he shorter distance of 25 km indicates the secure bit rate remains above 1 Mbps up to and beyond a sim-
ulated data bandwidth of 10 Tb/s. he experimental and theoretical simulated results far exceed those reported 
previously in the literature7–12 both in terms of data bandwidth and secure bit rate supported.
Our results suggest that QKD can co-exist with very high volumes of data, in excess of 10 Tb/s for ibres up 
to 50 km, transmitted simultaneously on the same ibre. his bandwidth is equivalent to one hundred 100 Gb/s 
data channels, suicient to ill most of the C-band. he secure key rate at 10 Tb/s is ~139 kb/s, which is adequate 
for sub-second (~0.2 s) refresh of the AES encryption key on each of the one hundred 100 G data channels. Our 
approach is particularly appropriate to applications such as of-site backup or data center interconnections, where 
many channels of homogenous traic might naturally share the same transmission hardware over a point-to-point 
link and the optical launch power can be easily controlled. In the future the bandwidth of data multiplexed with 
QKD may be further increased by using multi-mode or multi-core optical ibre23–25.
Methods
Quantum key distribution system. he QKD system is composed of two 19 inch rack units running a 
phase encoded BB84 protocol with eicient basis selection and decoy states in the inite key size regime14. he 
QKD transmitter uses pulses at a wavelength of 1547.72 nm and an average intensity of 0.4 photons/pulse for the 
signal states. Two decoy states are used with intensities of 0.1 and 7 × 10−3 photons/pulse. Phase encoding and 
decoding is achieved by the use of asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometers and the basis probabilities are set 
to the biased case of 31/32 and 1/32 for the majority and minority bases respectively. An optical MHz clock signal 
is transmitted over the same ibre for synchronisation of the QKD transmitter and receiver. he QKD receiver 
contains two InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes operating in self-diferencing mode3 clocked at 1 GHz with 
single photon eiciencies of 22.5% and dark count probabilities of 4.5 × 10−6. Simulations of the secure bit rates 
Figure 4. Secure key bit rate data bandwidth dependence. Experimental secure bit rate as a function of 
data bandwidth simulated by increasing the launch power of 10 data lasers. Experimental secure bit rate using 
a 100 GHz ilter in the quantum receiver (blue circles), extending the results reported in the inset of Fig. 3. 
Experimental secure bit rate data using a 25 GHz ilter in the quantum receiver (red circles). Blue and red 
triangles are the corresponding QBERs for both experiments. Solid and dashed lines are results from numerical 
simulations. Also shown are secure bit rate numerical simulations using a 25 GHz ilter in the quantum receiver 
for ibre distances of 25 km and 75 km (grey lines).
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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and QBERs in the presence of classical channels used experimentally determined scattering coeicients for each 
of the classical launched wavelengths.
High Speed Encryptors┻ he HSE classical transport layer are two ADVA FSP3000 19 inch rack units which 
house two 100 G AES encryptor line cards each containing a C form-factor pluggable (CFP) transceiver operating 
quadrature phase shit keying and dual polarization (DP-QPSK) with wavelengths (ITU grid channel numbers) 
1529.55 nm (60) and 1529.94 nm (60.5) respectively. A 96 channel DWDM multiplexer/demultiplexer ilter fea-
turing an insertion loss of approximately 5 dB was used to combine the two HSE wavelengths, before mixing them 
with the quantum traic by virtue of the CWDM multiplexing scheme. he HSE 100 G AES line cards have built 
in forward error correction (FEC). To maintain post-FEC error free operation (BER ≤ 10−15), it is important that 
the pre-FEC bit error rate (BER) does not exceed the FEC threshold of 1.9 × 10−2. We studied the pre-FEC BER at 
a ibre distance of 101 km since this had the highest optical loss of any distance and any aggravating efects, such 
as degradation in the optical signal to noise ratio, would be strongest. As can be seen from the inset in Fig. 2, the 
pre-FEC BER over a continuous duration of 2 hours for a ibre distance of 101 km was very stable, at an average 
value of 2.2 × 10−3 which is almost a factor of ten less than the pre-FEC threshold. he QKD generated keys at 
both the QKD transmitter and QKD receiver sides are pushed over their local communication interfaces to their 
respective high speed encryptors. hese keys are then used by replacing the usual publically exchanged keys for 
the AES encryption algorithm to create a symmetrically enabled AES encryption link.
Multiplexing scheme. We choose to take advantage of the naturally low insertion loss of around 1 dB7 for 
Coarse Wavelength Division Multiplexing (CWDM) to combine the quantum communication with the classical 
communication. Although CWDM technology is designed to support up to only 8 usable wavelength channels 
(around the low loss ibre wavelength of 1550 nm), it can be adapted to work in conjunction with DWDM archi-
tecture. he CWDM channel bands are around 18 nm wide indicating they can support up to 22 DWDM 100 GHz 
spaced channels or 44 DWDM 50 GHz spaced channels in each band26. In fact, using just two CWDM wavelength 
bands (1530 nm and 1550 nm), almost the entire 50 GHz DWDM spaced ITU C-band can be populated. All 
forward directed signals: quantum signal, the QKD synchronization signal, QKD reconciliation data signal and 
classical channels for ultra-high bandwidth secured data transmission are transmitted over a single ibre. he two 
ilters used in the experiments feature insertion losses of 0.9dB (100 GHz ilter) and 2 dB (25 GHz ilter).
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